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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we introduce uncertainty of the labour productivity of women in a competitive 
model of wage determination. We demonstrate that more qualified women are then offered 
much lower wages than men at the equilibrium. This result is consistent with the glass ceiling 
hypothesis according to which there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the 
wage distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, either developed or developing, it is well known that men and women with 
identical productive characteristics receive different levels of wage (see Blau and Kahn, 2000). 
Among the various explanations which have been suggested, economists have proposed 
theoretical models which most often focus on either qualifications or labour market treatment of 
similarly qualified individuals. On an empirical side, recent studies have evidence larger gender 
wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution, so that it concerns in most cases the more 
skilled workers. This is the so-called glass ceiling effect above women in the labour market. 
The seminal paper is due to Albrecht et alii (2003) using Swedish data. They show that the gender 
wage gap is empirically increasing throughout the conditional wage distribution and accelerating 
at the top during the nineties. Using data for Spain, De la Rica et alii (2005) stratify their sample 
by education group and find that the gender wage gap is expanding over the wage distribution 
only for the group with tertiary education, meaning that there is a glass ceiling only for the more 
educated1. Using the European Community Household Panel data set, similar conclusions are 
reached by Arulampalam et alii (2004) for their ten European countries s, both in the public and 
private sectors, with a gender wage gap typically wider at the top. 
 
Clearly, this finding seems challenging with respect to the existing arguments which seek to 
formally explain the gender wage gap. For instance, in models of statistical discrimination, 
differences in the treatment of men and women arise from average differences between the two 
groups in the expected value of productivity or in the reliability with which productivity may be 
predicted, which lead employers to discriminate on the basis of that average. Discriminatory 
exclusion of women from „male‟ jobs can also result in an excess supply of labour in „female‟ 
occupations, depressing wages there for otherwise equally productive workers. However, there is 
no reason to expect larger gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. 
 
An exception is the contribution of de la Rica et alii (2005). Since high-educated women have 
participation rates which are only slightly lower than male participation rates, women‟s and men‟s 
wages should not be very different in the lower part of the income distribution. Conversely, in 
the upper tail of the distribution, employees are most often reluctant to invest in women‟s 
training. This occurs because women have more favourable outside opportunities than men 
                                                 
1
 Conversely, for the less educated groups, the gender wage gap is wider at the bottom than the top (see de la Rica et 
alii, 2005). 
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within the household, for domestic work or child care, and hence are more likely to quit their job. 
Our purpose in this paper is to further investigate the idea that there is more uncertainty on 
female jobs than on male jobs.  
 
Specifically, we consider a competitive model of wage determination with uncertainty on the 
women‟s productivity. We assume that employers do as if male and female employees have equal 
productivity, but they attach more uncertainty to the women‟s careers. This is the case if they face 
greater incertitude towards females‟ employment duration over time, for instance as a result of 
their more discontinuous work participation. Wee demonstrate that firms are expected to offer 
lower wages to women, since they pass the risk of variability in women‟s production on female 
wages. Furthermore, the negative risk premium increases as women are more qualified. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a competitive model 
of wage determination with uncertainty on female productivity. In section, we derive the optimal 
wage policy. We show that employers set a negative wage premium on the female wage which is a 
convex function of the female level of human capital. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The basic model 
We consider a representative firm which produces a good tY  at date t . This good is sold on a 
competitive market and is treated as the numeraire ( 1p ). To produce that good, the firm hires 
two types of workers, men and women. We denote respectively by 1h  and 2h  the levels of 
human capital for a man and for a woman, 1h  being not necessarily equal to 2h . For the sake of 
simplicity, there is no on-the-job training in our model, so that the level of human capital remains 
constant over time for each employee. Let 1n  and 2n  be respectively the numbers of men and 
women who are currently working in the representative firm. 
 
We consider that the firm does not really know how long a worker will stay in the firm. This does 
not seem unrealistic a priori. Assuming that the expected duration of a job in a specific firm is 
given by )( 1TE  and )( 2TE  respectively for a man and a woman, then )(/1 11 TEq   and 
)(/1 22 TEq   are the probabilities respectively for a man and for a woman to quit their current 
job. We suppose that the probability to quit a job is higher for a woman, i.e. 12 qq  . It is well 
acknowledged that there exist gender differences in the labour force participation. Women are 
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less likely to have a paid job than men, they also most often interrupt their formal activities. This 
may occur because of births or other family events, women being for instance more likely to care 
for their elderly parents or to spend time educating their children. 
 
Hence, firm are likely to suffer from a higher uncertainty when evaluating the long-term 
productivity of their female workers with respect to male workers. To formalize this uncertainty, 
we introduce into the definition of the level of employment a random term on the female 
productivity. The quantity of efficient labour is then a random variable denoted by tN
~
 : 
 ttt nhnhN 2211
~~          (1) 
where tnh 11  and 
tnh 22
~  are respectively the male and female levels of employment. Importantly, 
we assume that the mean level of productivity is equal for male and female workers. However, 
there is more uncertainty on the female labour force participation., so that the term ~  may be 
described by a random variable such that 1)~( E  and 2)~(  Var . To get closed-form 
solutions, we make the following assumption concerning ~ . 
Assumption 1. The parameter ~  follows a Normal distribution ),1( 2N . 
Without loss of generality, we neglect the role of the capital factor in the production 
process. The production function for the representative firm may be expressed as: 
  )~(
~
2211
ttt nhnhFY         (2) 
(.)F  being a continuous function with decreasing returns ( 0(.)' F , 0(.)'' F ). We account 
for turnover costs in the model. Let tl1  and 
tl2  be the numbers of men and women hired each 
year by the firm. Hiring more qualified workers is more costly for the firm. We rely on linear 
specification for the turnover costs )( 11
tt lc  and )( 22
tt lc , so that ttt lhclc 1111 )()(   and 
ttt lhclc 2222 )()(   ( 0(.)' c , 0(.)'' c ). As there are entry and exit of workers in our setting, the 
following equations fully characterize the dynamics of employment within the representative firm 
respectively for men and women: 
  ttt nqldtdn 1111 /          (3) 
  ttt nqldtdn 2222 /          (4) 
At date t , the total level of employment either for men or women is given by the number of 
employees at date 1t  plus the difference between the number of hiring workers and the 
number of voluntary exits between 1t  and t . Finally, we define the profit function for the firm 
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at date t . Let 1w  and 2w  be the levels of wage for men and women, workers being remunerated 
at their marginal productivity. Hence, the firm‟s expected profit tE
~
 is : 
 
 ttttttt lhclhcnwnwnhnhFEE 221122112211 )()()]
~([
~
    (5) 
 
The problem for the firm is to maximize its expected profit discounted at the interest rate r
subject to the constraints which characterize the dynamics of employment over time : 
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
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3. The optimal wage policy 
 
We now turn to the optimal wage policy. It may easily be found by solving the previous 
problem of optimal control. Let us define the current value of the Hamiltonian H  such that:  
)()()()()]~([ 222211112122112211 nqlnqllclcnwnwnhnhFEH   (7) 
where 1  and 2  are the co-state variables associated respectively to the constraints on the levels 
of employment 1n  and 2n . The conditions of optimality for this problem are 0/ 1  lH , 
0/ 2  lH , 111 // nHrdtd    and 222 // nHrdtd   . Hence, we get:  
  0)( 11  hc         (8) 
  0)( 22  hc         (9) 
111111 )]
~
('[/ qwNFhErdtd        (10) 
  222122 )]
~
('~[/ qwNFhErdtd        (11) 
 
Since the marginal cost (.)c  is fixed by assumption (education levels are fixed), this implies that 
1  and 2  are constant, so that 0/1 dtd  and 0/2 dtd . From (10) and (11), it follows that 
)/())]
~
('[( 1111 qrwNFhE   and )/())]
~
('~[( 2222 qrwNFhE   . Since 11)( hc  and 
22 )( hc , we obtain the following optimal wages for men and for women: 
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)()()]
~
('[ 1111 hcqrNFEhw        (12) 
  )()()]
~
('~[ 2222 hcqrNFEhw         (13) 
  
At the equilibrium, the optimal male wage is given by the difference between the expected 
marginal productivity )]
~
('[1 NFEh  and the weighted turnover costs )()( 11 hcqr  . A similar 
reasoning applies for (13), but we note that there is an additional random term ~  when defining 
the woman‟s marginal productivity )]
~
('~[2 NFEh  . The normality assumption for the random 
perturbation ~  allows us to further specify the optimal wage policy for a competitive firm. 
Proposition 1. The optimal wage policy for the firm is such that: 
  )()()]
~
('[ 1111 hcqrNFEhw        (14) 
  )()()]
~
(''[)]
~
('[ 22
2
222 hcqrhNFENFEhw       (15) 
where )~(/)~( 22 nEnVar    is the coefficient of variation associated to the female productivity. 
 
Proof. Given the normality assumption for ~ , we can use the lemma of Stein (Rubinstein, 1976). 
Let us consider  two variables X  and Y  which are bivariate normally distributed. If the function 
)(Yf  is continuously differentiable, then ),cov())('())(,cov( YXYfEYfX  . By definition, we 
have ))
~
(',~cov()]
~
('[)~()]
~
('~[ NFNFEENFE   . Now, applying the Stein‟s lemma to our 
problem, we get ))~,~cov()]
~
(''[))
~
(',~cov( 2211  nhnhNFENF  . Provided that 1)
~( E  and 
2)~(  Var , we deduce 
2
222211 )
~,~cov(  nhnhnh  . Using (13), we finally obtain the 
following female wage )()()]
~
(''[)]
~
('[ 222
22
222 hcqrNFEnhNFEhw   . 
 
Let us further expand the term )]
~
(''[2
22
2 NFEnh  . We know that 
22
22 )
~(  nnVar   and 
22 )
~( nnE   since 1)~( E . Hence, given the definition of )~(/)~( 22 nEnVar   , it follows 
that )]
~
(''[)]
~
(''[ 222
22
2 NFEhNFEnh    . QED 
 
We now find that there is an additional term in the definition of the optimal female wage. 
It is given by the sum of the marginal expected productivity )]
~
('[2 NFEh  and a negative term 
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2)]
~
(''[ hNFE , minus the opportunity cost in terms of turnover )()( 22 hcqr  . Interestingly, the 
additional term )]
~
(''[22 NFEh  is a risk premium due to uncertainty on female productivity. As 
''F  is negative, this risk premium is negative. It depends on the shape of the technology F , on 
the coefficient of variation for the female productivity  , and also on the squared level of the 
woman‟s skill level 22h . As the gender wage gap is a convex positive function of 2h , one expects a 
significantly higher difference between male and female wages at the top of the income 
distribution, where workers are characterized by high education levels. This is exactly the core of 
the glass ceiling effect. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to explain why the gender wage gap may vary along the wage 
gap distribution. For that purpose, we have introduced in a competitive labour market model 
uncertainty on the female productivity, as women have more frequently interrupted careers and 
may choose to quit the labour force either to spend time with their children, to care for elderly 
parents, or to move with their husband when the latter is promoted in a new location.  
We demonstrate that accounting for uncertainty on the female productivity has important 
implications on the gender wage gap. Our main results are that firms are expected to set lower 
wage for women given uncertainty and that the underlying negative risk premium is higher for 
high-skilled women. Hence, in our theoretical framework, a larger gender wage gap is expected at 
the top of the wage distribution, as recently evidenced in European countries (Albrecht et alii, 
2003, De la Rica et alii, 2005, Arulampalam et alii, 2004). A question worth would be to assess the 
relevance of our argument dealing with uncertainty on female labour participation, as there may 
exist alternative theoretical explanations to rationalize the glass ceiling effect, and we leave this 
issue for future research. 
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